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EPILOGUE
PREFACE
Political scientists and law professors of my generation are able to see
what we see about constitutionalism because we are sitting comfortably on
Professor Sandy Levinson's shoulders.' While on that comfortable perch,
we see better the Constitution outside the courts,2 the relationships between
law and literature,3 the way in which monuments reflect and shape political
regimes,4 the complexities of torture in a democratic regime,' the rise of the
surveillance state and new presidentialism, 6 the virtues and challenges of
diversity,7 the nature of constitutional crises, t basic flaws in the Constitution
* Mark A. Graber is a Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School of Law and a
Professor of Government at the University of Maryland College Park. A version of this essay was
first presented at Princeton University at a conference to honor Professor Walter Murphy. I am
grateful to Professor Sandy Levinson for allowing me the opportunity to honor two giants of
constitutionalism in one swoop.
1. See Symposium: A Tribute to Sandy Levinson, 20 L. & CTS. (Law & Courts Section of Am.
Political Sci. Ass'n, New York, N.Y.), no. 3, Summer 2010, at 4-20 http://wwwl.law.nyu.edu/law
courts/pubs/newsletter/Newsletter/o20Summer/o2O 0.pdf.
2. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
3. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982).
4. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOcIETIES (1998).
5. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, TORTURE: A COLLECTION (2004).
6. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and
its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2010); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, The Processes of
Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006).
7. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY (2003).
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of the United States,' and the state constitutional alternative.'o The
publication of Compromise and Constitutionalism" will facilitate scholarly
engagement with the high price of sharing constitutional space with those
whose values are fundamentally different than ours.
Professor Levinson has been able to see so acutely in part because he
had the opportunity to sit on the shoulders of many scholarly giants. The
first was his dissertation advisor, Robert G. McCloskey, the longtime
Professor of Government at Harvard University.12  McCloskey is best
known to contemporary scholars as the author of The American Supreme
Court,13 a work which Professor Levinson has lovingly updated. 14 Walter F.
Murphy, the longtime McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence in the Politics
Department at Princeton University, was another mentor.'" Murphy was a
remarkable man.' 6  He was a war hero,' 7 an outstanding novelist,' 8 and a
scholar whose interests ranged from empirical studies of judicial decision
making in the United States' 9 to the practical and normative problems with
designing and maintaining constitutions that might shape and preserve just
political orders.20
McCloskey and Murphy were both concerned with constitutional
compromises. The central theme of The American Supreme Court is that
courts function best at the constitutional margins. McCloskey opposed
judicial decisions that sought to settle such major questions of constitutional
law as the precise degree of government power to regulate the national
8. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 707
(2009).
9. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
10. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, America's "Other Constitutions": The Importance of State
Constitutions for Our Law and Politics, 46 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
I1. Sanford Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 821 (2011).
12. See Sanford Levinson, Remarks Prepared for Lifetime Achievement Award Panel, in 20 L. &
CTS., supra note 1, at 18, 19.
13. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960).
14. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Sanford Levinson, rev., 5th ed.
2010).
15. See Levinson, supra note 12, at 20.
16. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The Passing ofa Generation, 20 L. & CTS. (Law & Courts Section
of Am. Political Sci. Ass'n, New York, N.Y.), no. 2, Spring 2010, at 5, http://wwwl.law.nyu.edu/
lawcourts/pubs/newsletter/LCNewsletterSpring_20-2.pdf, Sotirios Barber, Walter Murphy and the
Public Spirit, in 20 L. & CTS., supra, at 16; David J. Danelski, Walter F. Murphy: Hero, Scholar,
and Friend, in 20 L. & CTS., supra, at 17; James E. Fleming, An Appreciation of Walter F. Murphy,
in 20 L. & CTS., supra, at 18; Sanford Levinson, Walter Murphy: Semper Fi!, in 20 L. & CTS.,
supra, at 20.
17. See Danelski, supra note 16, at 17.
18. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, THE VICAR OF CHRIST (1979).
19. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
20. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING
A JUST POLITICAL ORDER (2007).
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economy or the free speech rights of communists. Instead, he preferred that
courts decide cases in ways that maintained a dialogue between all branches
of the national government over the best application of constitutional
principles in particular circumstances. "The Court's greatest successes,"
McCloskey wrote, "have been achieved when it has operated near the
margins rather than in the center of political controversy, when it has nudged
and gently tugged the nation, instead of trying to rule it."21 Murphy was
more self-conscious about the role of compromise in a constitutional order.
His Constitutional Democracy: Creating and Maintaining a Just Political
Order detailed at length the special challenges the need to compromise
presents to constitutional regimes committed to protecting fundamental
human rights.
The following essay pays tribute to Sandy Levinson's thoughts on
constitutional compromises by paying tribute to the thoughts on
constitutional compromises of our common mentor, Walter Murphy. Rather
than directly engage in a dialogue with Compromise and Constitutionalism,
the analysis below joins the preexisting dialogue between Professors
Levinson and Murphy on how to construct a decent polity among people
who have deep disputes over what constitutes political decency. Walter
Murphy is unfortunately largely known to legal audiences only through the
work of such outstanding mentees as Sandy Levinson, Jim Fleming,
Christopher Eisgruber, Andrew Koppelman, Jennifer Nedelsky, and Robert
George. Walter Murphy's Constitutional Democracy and other magnificent
opuses merit close reading. Law professors should not rest content with
learning about one of the most important constitutional thinkers of our time
only through the work of his students.
I. INTRODUCTION
Why is Walter Murphy's seminal work on constitutionalism,
Constitutional Democracy, different from (almost) all other seminal works
on constitutionalism? Most classics of late twentieth century constitutional
theory in the United States are devoted to theories of constitutional
adjudication and interpretation. John Hart Ely insists that justices should
promote the democratic vision of the Constitution; 22 Robert Bork argues that
justices should promote the original vision of the constitution; 23 Ronald
21. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 13, at 229.
22. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
23. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
(1990).
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Dworkin asserts that justices should promote the aspirational vision of the
constitution;2 4 Sandy Levinson maintains that elected officials and ordinary
citizens should have some authority as constitutional interpreters; 25 Mark
Tushnet wants to take the power to declare laws unconstitutional away from
justices,26 at least as that power is exercised in the United States.27
Constitutional Democracy expands the scope of constitutional inquiry.
Murphy explores the normative commitments entailed by constitutional
democracy, the institutions most likely to realize those normative
commitments, and the characteristics of the good citizen necessary for
maintaining a constitutional democracy.
Theories of constitutional interpretation and adjudication, Murphy
demonstrates, are only a small facet of the constitutionalist enterprise. Who
should interpret, whose interpretations should be authoritative, and how
interpretation should be done must be derived from more basic
understandings of constitutional purposes and institutions. Determining
whether to have a presidential or a parliamentary system is more crucial to
the constitutional order than determining whether courts ought to have the
power to declare that certain holiday displays violate the Establishment
Clause. Constitutional democracy is more likely to survive when citizens
are committed to constitutional norms than when justices consistently apply
the "right" theory of constitutional adjudication. Perhaps academic lawyers,
given the particular institutional missions of law schools, ought to continue
equating constitutional theory with the theory of constitutional adjudication
when teaching and writing. Their students and the broader public should
nevertheless remember, as Constitutional Democracy so vitally emphasizes,
that the fundamental questions of constitutionalism are for elected officials,
political movements, and citizens to answer, even such questions as should
courts have the authority to fix constitutional meanings.28
Professor Murphy's claim that "[c]onstitutionalism demand[s]
adherence ... to principles that center on respect for human dignity and the
obligations that flow from those principles," 29 however, risks unduly
narrowing the constitutional enterprise. The problem is not simply, perhaps
not even, that identifying constitutionalism with a commitment to basic
human rights removes many regimes from constitutional study.
Constitutional Democracy insists that authoritarian political orders may be
24. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
25. See LEVINSON, supra note 2.
26. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
27. See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2008).
28. Professor Stephen Elkin has also been emphasizing these points for years. See STEPHEN L.
ELKIN, RECONSTRUCTING THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AFTER MADISON
(2006).
29. MURPHY, supra note 20, at 16.
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"constitutionist" if the political leaders respect the norms laid out in the
constitutional text of that regime. 30 This may simply be more awkward
terminology for what Ran Hirschl labels "constitutional theocracies.,,31 Still,
debunking the conventional notion that Americans in 1787 were committed
to constitutional government has the virtue of highlighting how governing
institutions at the founding were designed to protect slavery as well as
fundamental human rights. The more troubling problem is that the
distinction between constitutionalism and constitutionism obscures how
disputes over what constitutes human dignity and fundamental human rights
may structure numerous elements of the constitutional regime. The
characters in Professor Murphy's fictional constitutional convention bargain
with persons whom they believe deny fundamental human rights, and their
reasons for doing so suggest that such debates are endemic to constitutional
democracy. Rather than treat abortion as a "special case,"32 the American
experience with slavery suggests that "covenants with death" 3 are at the
heart of the constitutionalist enterprise.34
This brief note explores Professor Murphy's analysis of proposed
constitutional protections for legal abortion and the unborn as a means for
elaborating on "the problem of constitutional evil.",3  Problems of
constitutional evil arise when people have good reasons for sharing civic
space with persons they believe are committed to abhorrent practices.
Persons who find themselves in such a regime may have to provide far more
accommodations for injustice than the distinction between constitutionalism
and constitutionism may indicate are necessary. The same justifications for
the compromises over abortion made in the fictional polity of Nusquam
justify compromises over slavery made in the antebellum United States.
These constitutional compromises present particularly difficult interpretive
problems that cannot be resolved by shared understandings of human dignity
or fundamental rights. The greater the political significance of controversies
over what constitutes human dignity, the more likely that basic
constitutional institutions were structured with these controversies in mind,
and the more crucial that constitutional institutions, including practices for
30. See id. at 15.
31. Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle Eastern
Tales, 82 TEx. L. REv. 1819, 1820 (2004).
32. See MURPHY, supra note 20, at 315-22.
33. HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY
313 (1998).
34. See Levinson, supra note i1, at 828-32.
35. This is, of course, a shameless plug for MARK A. GRABER, DRED Scor AND THE PROBLEM
OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006).
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interpreting the constitution, generate solutions that continue
accommodating persons who lack a common ideal of the good polity.
The bargains that make constitutions possible caution against too sharp
a distinction between acting on principle and compromising. Much legal
theory is premised on a distinction between law and politics often rooted in
this distinction between principles and compromise. Murphy tells us that
"[c]onstitutionalism demand[s] adherence ... to principles that center on
respect for human dignity and the obligations that flow from those
principles."36 Levinson tells us that "[p]olitics is indeed the art of accepting
all sorts of lesser evils." 3 7 "Perhaps one can say that compromises do not
fully 'abandon principle,"' he writes, "but they often leave ostensible
principles hanging by the weakest of threads."38 On a different view, the
view advanced in this essay, compromise is rooted in the same kinds of
principles as equality, justice, liberty, human dignity, and other
constitutional goods. The person who never compromises can no more
claim faithfulness to the Constitution of the United States or any constitution
than the person who denies that all persons are entitled to "the equal
protection of the law."
II. COMPROMISING WITH EVIL
Constitutional democrats make compromises on matters they believe
concern human dignity and fundamental rights. Some participants in
Professor Murphy's fictional constitutional convention insist that legal
abortion violates fundamental human rights. "If... we agree that human
dignity is our central value and human life is sacred," one delegate to the
fictional constitutional convention in Nusquam contends, "[o]nly when
another human life is at risk could we remain true to that central value and
say that a mother has a constitutional right to kill the human fetus she's
carrying."39 Another delegate immediately responds, "And what about the
dignity of the woman." 4 0  "Doesn't her human dignity," she continues,
"require that she control her own body and life?" 4 1 Subsequent debate
reveals substantial differences over whether and what abortion policies are
consistent with the constitutional commitment to human dignity.
Nevertheless, aware that no faction is likely to "convince our opponents that
we were right,"42 a constitutional compromise is agreed on. In a close vote,
the convention agrees to "a clear statement in a constitutional charter that
36. MURPHY, supra note 20, at 16.
37. Levinson, supra note 11, at 828.
38. Id. at 18.
39. MURPHY,supra note 20, at 315.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 320.
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human life is sacred and, with the Constitutional Court part of the decision-
making process, [to] allow the political processes to make the initial
choice."43
Nusquam apparently remains a constitutional democracy after reaching
a compromise on abortion, although why is not clearly stated in
Constitutional Democracy. That the constitution neither explicitly permits
nor clearly bans abortion hardly demonstrates the proper respect for basic
human rights. The constitution of a constitutional democracy could hardly
declare that persons have inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, but grant the elected officials the power to enslave persons of
color or deprive them of fundamental rights. That all sides to the debate
over abortion derive their positions from a commitment to human dignity
does not adequately distinguish compromises over abortion from the
compromises antebellum Americans reached over slavery. Slaveholders
engaged in rights talk as well as abolitionists. They invoked the right not to
be deprived of property without due process," insisted that anti-slavery laws
passed without their consent were forms of enslavement, 45 and claimed that
abolitionist rhetoric insulted their dignity as moral beings. 46 Self-interest
does not explain why so many southern soldiers, slaveholders and non-
slaveholders, willingly engaged in near suicidal battle charges during the
Civil War.
The ostensible justification for the compromise over abortion in
Nusquam is the same pragmatic justification given for compromises over
slavery in the antebellum United States. Constitutional accommodations for
perceived evils in both regimes were the price for constitutional union.
Professor Murphy's apparent alter ego, Professor Retlaw Deukalion, urged
concessions on abortion that would allow "both sides ... to live together in
peace." 47  Representatives from the free states during the drafting and
ratification conventions sounded this chord when urging forbearance on
slavery. "If we do not agree on this middle & moderate ground," Oliver
Ellsworth warned fellow delegates at the framing convention, "we should
lose two States, with such others as may be disposed to stand aloof, should
fly into a variety of shapes & directions, and most probably into several
confederations and not without bloodshed." 48 Other northern framers spoke
43. Id. at 321.
44. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857).
45. See MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FAILURE 154 (1998).
46. See CONG. GLOBE, 25TH CONG., 2D SESS. APP. 558 (1838).
47. MURPHY, supra note 20, at 320.
48. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 375 (Max Farrand ed. 1937).
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of "the necessity of compromise" when justifying constitutional protections
for slavery.49
The American compromises on slavery in 1787 may be more consistent
with constitutional democracy than Nusquamite or American compromises
on abortion in 2008. Many northern framers had some grounds for thinking
that slavery was dying a natural death. David Brion Davis notes the growing
"general consensus" in the United States and Europe that government need
not act to weaken human bondage. "[B]lack slavery," conventional wisdom
in the late eighteenth century maintained, "was a historical anomaly that
could survive for a time only in the plantation societies where it had become
the dominant mode of production."so Roger Sherman urged northern
delegates at the framing convention not to be concerned about constitutional
protections for human bondage because "the abolition of slavery seemed to
be going on in the U.S. & that the good sense of the several States would
probably by degrees compleat it."5 ' No member of the Nusquam convention
claimed that time alone might resolve debates over reproductive choice.52
Good reason exists for thinking that some accommodation for slavery was
necessary in 1787 for any constitutional arrangement to be reached. James
Madison informed Thomas Jefferson that "S. Carolina & Georgia were
inflexible on the point of the slaves." No such necessity seems apparent
with respect to abortion, either in Nusquam or the United States. No state is
likely to secede from the Union should abortion policy dramatically tilt in
either a pro-life or pro-choice direction.
The problem of constitutional evil cannot be finessed in the Nusquamite
case by acknowledging that persons with wrong opinions on abortion are
better described as having made a moral mistake or suffering from a moral
blindspot than as abandoning the constitutional commitment to human
dignity. Claims that constitutional democracy exists when all parties make
good faith appeals to human dignity do not distinguish contemporary
debates over abortion from antebellum debates over slavery. Many
participants in contemporary abortion debates do not make this concession.
Advocates who claim that pro-life advocates are misogynists or who equate
abortion clinics with concentration camps do not treat rival positions as
grounded in a reasonable, if mistaken, conception of human flourishing.
While many abolitionists hurled related epithets at slaveholders, Lincoln did
not. The Illinois Republican insisted that all parties to debates over human
49. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 48, at 587.
50. DAVID BRION DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN PROGRESS 81 (1984).
51. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 48, at 369-70.
52. The increased use of morning-after pills may complicate the assertion in the text. See Rob
Stein, As Abortion Rate Drops, Use ofRU-486 Is on Rise, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2008, at Al.
53. Letters from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24 & Nov. 1, 1787), in 8 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: VIRGINIA
105 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988).
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bondage shared the same moral capacities. "[Tihe Southern slaveholders
were neither better, nor worse than we of the North, and ... we of the North
were no better than they," he declared. In his view, "[i]f we were situated as
they are, we should act and feel as they do; and if they were situated as we
are, they should act and feel as we do; and we never ought to lose sight of
this fact in discussing the subject."S4 Hard data is lacking, but one suspects
the percentage of advocates in the abortion debate who believe their rivals
are as committed as they to fundamental human rights is probably not much
different than the percentage of advocates in slavery debates believed their
rivals made good faith appeals to human dignity.
The fictional experience of Nusquam and actual experience in the
United States suggests that commitments to democracy provide more
practical protections for basic human rights than commitments to
constitutionalism. Democratic practice imposes several barriers to injustice.
Aspirants for power in a democracy must make arguments and advocate
policies that are consistent with the democratic commitment to popular rule
and popular notions of human dignity. This practical constraint rules out
political calls for re-enslavement at present and constitutional protections for
abortion before the Civil War. Authoritarian rulers who typically appeal to a
narrower constituency have greater rhetorical latitude when defending their
preferred policies. The distinctive constitutional commitment to human
dignity is unlikely to do more than democracy can deliver. Abortion in
contemporary politics and slavery in the nineteenth century highlight how
debate in democracies tends to be between factions with very different
understandings of human dignity, not between the party of human dignity
and the party of self-interest. When persons have sincere beliefs that the
genders have different destinies, that different races cannot share the same
political space, that the unborn have fewer rights than the born, or that a
four-cell blob with human DNA has the same rights as a human adult,
appeals to the constitutional commitment to human dignity or the
constitutional ban on naked preferences55 are likely to do no political,
intellectual, or academic work.
III. INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISES
Interpreting constitutional compromises is challenging theoretically and
politically. Potential linguistic ambiguities often do not present practical
54. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Bloomington, Illinois (May 29, 1856), in 2 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 230 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
55. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689
(1984).
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interpretive problems when a consensus exists on underlying purposes or
principles. Gilbert and Sullivan's Frederick may have suffered a longer
indenture than anticipated to the Pirates of Penzance for being born on
February 29 because his contract specified that he would be released only on
his twenty-first birthday. No one thinks being born in leap year influences
eligibility to be president of the United States. Agreement exists either that
"the Age of thirty five Years" in Article II does not refer to birthdays or that,
if the provision is linguistically ambiguous, the underlying purposes are best
achieved by measuring age by years rather than by birthdays.s6  This
recourse to generally agreed on principles or purposes is impossible when
potential linguistic ambiguities in constitutional compromises become
politically salient. When constitutional language is a consequence of
disagreement over basic human rights or over what policies promote human
dignity, noting that "the ultimate objective of purposive constitutional
interpretation is to maintain both the nation and the values of constitutional
democracy"" is unlikely to provide guidelines for resolving controversies
over what the contested provisions mean.
Consider the interpretive problems that would arise in Nusquam after a
legislator proposes that all doctors be required to perform abortions at the
request of a pregnant woman. The Constitution of Nusquam declares that
"human life is sacred," but also that governing officials shall have the power
to determine when a woman shall have the legal right to terminate a
pregnancy.58 The latter provision does not make explicit whether the power
to determine the right of a woman to have an abortion encompasses the
power to require that particular doctors perform abortions. Originalism in
any form is inadequate to the interpretive task. The persons responsible for
the Constitution of Nusquam did not consider whether doctors could be
compelled to perform abortions, no general understanding existed at the time
of ratification on the public meaning of the relevant language, and the
principles underlying the constitutional provisions were disputed. Instead,
the American constitutional experience with slavery suggests four very
different interpretive strategies for interpreting this and other constitutional
compromises.
The legislative power to determine the legality of abortion might be
interpreted as elaborating the constitutional principle that "all human life is
sacred." What "all life is sacred" means must be determined in light of the
constitutional willingness to tolerate abortion. That the constitution permits
governing officials to prefer the rights of the born to the rights of the unborn
suggests that, although all human life is sacred, either the unborn are not
constitutional humans or they lack the rights of born humans. This analysis
56. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
57. MuRPHY, supra note 20, at 489.
58. Id. at 321
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suggests legislative power over abortion should be broadly construed. If
governing officials may determine that a woman's right to terminate a
pregnancy trumps the value of unborn life, then they may determine that
right also trumps a doctor's freedom not to perform the abortion. The
Justices in Dred Scott demonstrated how a constitutional compromise may
be used to elaborate a more general constitutional principle when they
insisted that constitutional protections for property in the territories clearly
encompassed constitutional protections for human property. In their view,
the clear constitutional guarantees for slavery supported a constitutional
understanding that slaveholders had all the rights of other property holders.
"[T]he Constitution," Taney wrote, "recognizes the right of property of the
master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of
property and other property owned by a citizen . .." Hence, he
continued, "no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States ...
has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to [slavery] the benefit of the
provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of
private property against the encroachments of the Government."60
The legislative power to determine the legality of abortion might also be
interpreted as an exception to the constitutional principle that "all life is
sacred." Explicit constitutional authorization for legal abortion was
necessary because legislation legalizing abortion would otherwise violate the
constitutional commitment to the sanctity of life. Understood as an
exception to general constitutional principles, the constitutional power of
governing officials should be interpreted as narrowly as possible. If the
constitution does not plainly indicate that the legislature may compel doctors
to perform abortions, then such a law is unconstitutional. The dissenters in
Dred Scott treated the compromises over slavery as an exception to more
fundamental constitutional principles when they claimed, "[s]lavery, being
contrary to natural right, is created only by municipal law."61 In the absence
of any constitutional provision plainly authorizing persons to bring slaves
into the territories, no such right existed or could be inferred from other
constitutional provisions.
Constitutional compromises may create interpretive no-fly zones. The
constitutional rules on abortion, being compromises, may neither be
considered as elaborations on, or exceptions to, the general constitutional
commitment to human dignity or the sanctity of life. When potential
ambiguities arise, they must be resolved by recourse to principles underlying
59. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451 (1856).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 524 (Curtis, J., dissenting); see also id. at 547-49 (McLean, J., dissenting).
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other constitutional provisions. Whether doctors may be constitutionally
required to perform abortions may be determined by reference to the
constitutional principles underlying religious freedom or legislative
authority to regulate the medical profession, but no legitimate reference may
be made to the principle of human dignity underlying the constitutional
authority to regulate abortion because no constitutional principle explains or
justifies that provision. Madison suggested such an interpretive approach
when he gave up trying to find any coherent justification for treating slaves
as three-fifths of a person. He simply pronounced the relevant constitutional
provision to be one of many "compromising expedient[s] of the
Constitution." 62 This refusal to ground the Three-Fifths Clause in any more
general principle meant that disputes over fractional persons could be
resolved only by interpreting the principles underlying constitutional
provisions unrelated to slavery.
Constitutional compromises in constitutional texts might support the
interpretive principle that constitutional disputes ought to be compromised.
If compromises on basic questions of human dignity are necessary when
creating constitutions, then the same spirit of compromise ought to be
practiced when interpreting constitutional ambiguities. In the spirit of the
Nusquamite framers, who accommodated both proponents and opponents of
legal abortion, subsequent constitutional authorities might determine that
governing officials may constitutionally require doctors to perform abortions
only when no other doctor is willing and available to perform the procedure.
Some antebellum justices interpreted constitutional provisions on abortion in
the same compromising spirit. After noting that the constitutional framers
compromised on slavery, federal justices agreed to interpret broadly both the
federal power to return fugitive slaves63 and the federal power to prohibit the
importation of foreign slaves.M
Elaboration, exception, no-fly, and compromise may all be legitimate
strategies for interpreting constitutional provisions that accommodate
different beliefs about human dignity. Liberal constitutionalists, Howard
Schweber convincingly asserts, commit themselves to speaking a certain
language when debating fundamental regime matters. Americans, when
debating the constitutional status of capital punishment, must talk in terms of
"cruel and unusual punishments" rather than "efficient punishments."
Deterrence matters only because the failure to deter may be a mark of a cruel
and unusual punishment. When debating abortion, Nusquamites are
constitutionally committed to recognizing that all life is sacred and that
62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 339 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
63. See, e.g., Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860) (No. 15,329)
(Campbell, J.); Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1026 (C.C.D. Ga. 1859) (No. 18,269a) (Wayne, J.).
65. See HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE LANGUAGE OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007).
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governing officials have the power to determine the scope of the right to
terminate a pregnancy. Their rhetoric must also provide an account of other
constitutional provisions, most notably constitutional provisions on gender
equality,66 that are relevant to determining the constitutional status of
reproductive choice. Which arguments, policies, and constitutional
understandings that respect these commitments become the official law of
the land is for the constitutional politics initially established during the
drafting and ratification process to decide.
Antebellum American framers were more interested than their fictional
Nusquamite counterparts in the structure of the constitutional politics that
would temporarily and perhaps permanently settle intense disputes over
what human rights were fundamental. The framers in 1789 foreswore
making many particular rules, seeking instead to have future debates over
human bondage settled by particular constitutional politics.67  The
compromises responsible for the final structure of the national legislature,
national executive, and national judiciary were all made with an eye toward
future compromises over slavery. Constitutional institutions, functioning as
originally expected, would guarantee that all policies that touched on human
bondage would have substantial support in both the free and slave states.
Abortion in Nusquam, by comparison, was largely relegated to a "special
case." Debates over the right to terminate a pregnancy occasionally arose
when Nusquamites were considering the structure of governing institutions,
but most basic decisions on the structure of government were not made with
an eye toward future abortion policy.
Constitutional regimes are unlikely in practice to experience this sharp a
separation between questions about the structure of government and
questions about how to resolve disputes over what human rights are
fundamental. Governing institutions are rarely debated politically primarily
in terms of their intrinsic merits. Persons tend to support those institutional
arrangements they believe will most likely privilege their best understanding
of human dignity and secure what they believe are fundamental interests.
Changes in partisan support for judicial supremacy in the United States, for
example, have historically taken place after changes in the course of judicial
policy making. Whether constitutions survive may depend on how well they
mediate intense disputes over what practices best respect human dignity.
Nusquam will become a stable constitutional polity only if constitutional
66. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985).
67. For an elaboration on the arguments in this paragraph, see GRABER, supra note 35, at 102-
03.
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institutions consistently yield policies that most citizens find tolerable, even
if those policies are inconsistent in many respects with what any particular
person believes is entailed by a constitutional commitment to human dignity.
Disputes over human dignity saturate constitutions. They influence the
structure of governing institutions, the specific limits on government power,
and the principles used to interpret constitutional ambiguities.68
constitutional regimes are wracked by cultural wars, constitutional
democracy must be as committed to mediating those disputes as to
promoting human dignity or securing increased public support for
fundamental human rights. Whether the end result is best labeled
"constitutionalism" or "constitutionism," if not largely a semantic question,
will largely be in the eyes of the beholder. Some protection for
constitutional evils is the fate of ongoing constitutional projects in diverse
society. Professor Murphy frequently highlights the importance of
compromise during the process of creating and interpreting constitutions.69
The theory of constitutional democracy, the American experience suggests,
should regard these compromises as central to the constitutional enterprise
rather than as special cases that can be resolved independently from more
basic constitutional decisions.
EPILOGUE
John Paul Sartre articulated a basic truth of political theory in No Exit
when one of the main characters declares, "Hell is-other people!" 70
Edmund Burke offered the polite version of this political catechism when he
insisted, "All government-indeed every human benefit and enjoyment,
every virtue and every prudent act-is founded on compromise and barter."
For better and undoubtedly worse, human beings constantly find themselves
in environments where they must cooperate with persons whom they find, if
not morally reprehensible on most subjects, morally reprehensible on some
subjects. If principle is understood as the set of values that enable human
beings to live a decent life, then the obligation to agree to constitutional
compromises when creating and maintaining constitutional orders is as
fundamental a principle as any other.
68. See id. at 1-2.
69. See MURPHY, supra note 20, at 473, 494.
70. JOHN-PAUL SARTRE, NO EXIT AND THREE OTHER PLAYS 47 (L. Abel trans., Vintage Books
Ed. 1955)(1944).
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